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Persuasion Theories and the Linguist
The title of this paper is perhaps too presumptuous because the focal 
problem of the paper are a couple of issues related to persuasive ef­
fects in advertisements. What justifies the title, though, is that the pa­
per attempts to combine what psychology tells us about persuasion with 
what the linguist can do while analysing a message which is supposed 
to be persuasive. The general assumption is that the most appropriate 
and natural framework within which to account for persuasion, social 
influence, or compliance gaining is the general theory of human ac­
tion; linguistic behaviour being just one of many potential ways people 
may choose in order to influence other people. The paper is divided into 
two parts; first, I will focus on some aspects of persuasion and theoret­
ical models of persuasion, then 1 will try to point out how a particular 
model of persuasion encourages a particular linguistic perspective. To 
be more precise, I will try to show why the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
of persuasion is of particular relevance in the case of advertisements. 
Later, starting with the assumption that this model suggests that a lin­
guist should pay more attention to what I call the third-level rhetorical 
effects, i. e. the rhetorical effects anchored in conceptualisations result­
ing from linguistic coding, I will analyse some examples of advertising 
slogans in which the persuasive effects result from the linguistic coding 
of the source-path-goal conceptual schema. 
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Persuasion
The central problem one has to overcome in establishing a definition of 
persuasion is that the definiendum is a broad term referring to a phe­
nomenon of a truly protean nature. Not only do common sense defi­
nitions differ from those presented by scholars active in various fields, 
and the definitions given by scientists working within the same field 
stress differing aspects, but also, and most importantly, persuasion as be­
haviour has many facets; thus the definitions are either too general or 
too particular. To realise what a complex phenomenon persuasion may 
be, it is enough to think of the omnipresent co-existence of pictorial and 
verbal messages in advertisements. If we compare picture-based com­
munication and verbal discourse, it is clear that the former
does not have an explicit syntax for expressing causal claims, analogies, and 
other kinds of propositions; arguments made through sequences of images 
can be said, in principle, to be more open to the perceiver’s own interpreta­
tion than are verbal arguments. (Messaris 1997: 273)
Even if the two kinds of messages are meant to be complementary and 
mutually supportive, their persuasive impact is of different nature and 
calls for different explanations.
The approach embraced in this paper is that of a linguist, so it is lan­
guage that is primarily brought into focus; nonetheless verbal persuasion 
understood only as the use of certain lexical items, structures, and ways 
of developing discourse - in short, as the use of language - is no more 
than a part of the persuasive process. In other words, a linguistic analysis, 
however broad, is never a full and comprehensive account of how some­
body is "being persuaded.” On the other hand, a linguistic analysis, if it is 
to be adequate, must take into account a variety of extralinguistic factors.
It is exactly in the sense of persuasion-as-behaviour that the concept 
is defined by psychologists. In their monograph, Seiter and Gass (2004) 
provide 22 definitions of the term but they openly state that
[they] wish to acknowledge from the outset that [they] maintain no illusions 
about there being a "correct” definition of persuasion. Various scholars and 
researchers conceptualize persuasion differently and therefore subscribe to 
varying definitions of the term. And although there are some commonalities
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among some definitions, there are as many differences as there are similari­
ties. (Seiter and Gass 2004: 17)
The multitude of definitions reflects five basic issues about which there 
is no universal agreement among researchers. The issues are the follow­
ing: 1) whether persuasion is intentional or not, 2) whether persuasion 
means only a successful activity, 3) whether persuasion refers only to 
conscious efforts, 4) whether persuasion is effected only via symbolic 
action, and 5) whether self-persuasion may also be legitimately called 
persuasion (Seiter and Gass 2004).
The analysis of the phenomenon as it is understood by various schol­
ars leads to the conclusion that persuasion is a prototypical category: 
prototypical in the sense used in cognitive sciences. In other words, there 
are no clear sufficient and necessary conditions/properties that must ob­
tain for a phenomenon to be called persuasion (which would be typical 
of classical categorization). Rather, individual instances of persuasion, 
particular persuasive attempts, share only some properties, and what re­
ally ties them all together within one conceptual category is “family re­
semblance” (Wittgenstein 1953).
This conclusion obviously reflects psychological reality and our 
common experience concerning the phenomenon of persuasion. The 
abundance of contexts, mediums, channels, and behaviours that are in­
volved in persuasive efforts makes it impossible to provide a satisfactory 
and exhaustive description that could cover all instances counting as 
persuasion. Some actions aiming at influencing people are considered 
more prototypical cases of persuasion than others and there are also ac­
tions that will be regarded as persuasive attempts by some and not by 
others.
In view of the fact that the persuasion process is elusive and per­
suasion itself should be treated as a prototypical category rather than a 
classical one, it comes as no surprise that at present no single theoret­
ical perspective upon which all scholars would agree can be identified. 
There is a multitude of theories, some accounting for a great number of 
persuasive phenomena, some applying only to a very limited and spe­
cific contexts or situations.
In the 1980s two models that are somehow complementary and 
move away from the attitude-behaviour issue, central to the persuasion 
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research earlier on, were proposed. One is the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM), the other the Heuristic Model (HMP). The ELM, elaborated 
by Petty and Cacioppo (1981, 1986, 1990) focuses on how messages are 
received. The authors argue that there are two “modes,” or two distinct 
routes to persuasion: the central route and the peripheral route. The cen­
tral route means careful examination of persuasive messages, the effect 
of which is dependent on both the content of the message and the elab­
oration of the content. The peripheral route means practically no elabo­
ration of the message but reliance on various heuristics and the “periph­
eral” cues in message evaluations.
The model stipulates that message elaboration varies along the 
“elaboration likelihood continuum.” One end of this continuum is a cog­
nitive involvement characterised by active processing. The other is a 
cognitive inactivity, where processing is performed almost without or 
with very little cognitive effort. From this perspective specifying con­
ditions for the occurrence of both modes of processing becomes the 
central issue. Petty and Cacioppo acknowledge that there are a vari­
ety of factors that may determine whether the central or peripheral 
route is followed; three factors, however, are especially decisive: mo­
tivation, cognitive ability, and need for cognition. A message is likely 
to motivate the message recipient to cognitively process it if the mes­
sage content is of high relevance for him. Cognitive ability, just as 
the need for cognition, means not only idiosyncratic characteristics of 
the message recipient but also external factors such as, for example, 
distraction.
Some of the theoretical and practical limitations of this model gave 
an impulse for postulating the Heuristic Model (HMP). Chaiken (1987) 
suggested also two modes of message elaboration: systematic processing 
and heuristic processing. The concept of systematic processing is simi­
lar to Petty and Cacioppo’s central route; heuristic processing is slightly 
different from peripheral processing:
Peripheral processing reflects a variety of psychological motivations empha­
sizing the association of the speaker’s position with rewarding or unreward­
ing persuasive cues. Conversely, heuristic processing reflects a single mo­
tivation, that is, evaluation of the message recommendation with minimal 
cognitive effort. (Stiff 1994: 192)
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The ELM model is an either-or model, so it cannot explain the in­
stances where both peripheral and central processing co-occur; the HMP 
model, on the other hand, accounts for parallel processing without dif­
ficulties.
Without going into detail on the ELM and putting aside some reser­
vations, irrelevant in the case of press advertising, that have been put for­
ward since the model was presented for the first time, it may be assumed 
that in press ads, especially in headlines, slogans and catchphrases, the 
essential way of creating a persuasive potential is using elements whose 
powers of persuasion consist first of all in activating the peripheral route. 
The addressee is to accept the message reflexively and intuitively. Or, at 
least such acceptance has to be the first step leading to further elabora­
tion based on rational argumentation. In other words, peripheral elabo­
ration may be a necessary stage creating a favourable attitude on the part 
of the addressee that may, but does not have to, be followed by activating 
the central route. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that a great 
number of advertisements are based on activating solely the peripheral 
route, which is not a preliminary stage leading to further analysis but 
an aim in itself.
I have focused here on the ELM because it is the model that reflects 
best the communicative situation in most press advertisement. The anal­
ysis of this situation leads to the conclusion that most advertisements 
in the press (in particular, slogans, headlines, catchphrases) are mes­
sages in which all constituent elements, the verbal layer included, are 
subject to one governing principle: the message has to be composed in 
such a way that its basic functions may be performed on the assump­
tion that the receiver does not get involved in the decoding process and 
the process itself is short-lived. Simplifying things a bit, one can say that 
it means that the message should be simple, clear, acceptable, familiar, 
natural, and attractive.
Three Levels of Rhetorical Effects
The cognitive perspective on language emphasizes on the one hand the 
role of the speaker in the process of coding messages, and the role of 
the addressee in the process of decoding on the other. Seen from this 
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perspective, any act of communication has some rhetorical potential 
that is realised through particular coding governed by the aims and in­
tentions of the speaker. Rhetorical effects to be achieved are usually of 
three distinct kinds. First-level effects result from the overall organisa­
tion of the text, second-level effects are a matter of lexical choices and 
word patterns, and third-level effects are rhetorical aspects of the men­
tal construction of meaning (conceptualisations). The clear boundaries 
between the levels are not to be accurately delineated, since rhetorical 
effects are rather "holistic”; they refer to the overall persuasive import 
of a message.
It is sometimes especially difficult to differentiate between the 
second- and the third-level effects. Let us take an example to point out 
to the three levels and to signal the difficulties involved in distinguishing 
between them.
(1) How do you conquer the highest mountain? The same way you accom­
plish any task. One step at a time. The gutsy part is setting the goal in the 
first place. Fairchild Aerospace is determined to set the pace in the global 
market for 30- to 95-seat jet airliners and large-cabin business jets. And 
we’re doing it one aircraft at a time. Starting with our revolutionary 328JET 
and moving forward with the all new 428JET, 528JET, 728JET, and 928JET 
Eventually we’ll have an entire family of aircraft that fits the market. All 
designed for long-haul comfort. Maximum economy. And peak perfor­
mance.
As for the first-level rhetorical effects, that is the effects resulting 
from the overall organisation of the text, we can distinguish here four 
constitutive parts of the advertising text that conform to a more general 
persuasive scheme. Such schemes, recurrent rhetorical patterns reflect­
ing our general mental preferences and motivations in persuasive pro­
cesses, find numerous applications. At the beginning of his book about 
rhetoric, Nash (1989) analyses the seduction of Eve as presented in the 
Book of Genesis and points out a pattern that is repeated in numerous 
persuasive messages that appeared later on in various persuasive "gen­
res.” Here is the scheme and particular sentences from the Book of Gen­
esis (cf. Gen. 3,1-4) that mark off consecutive segments of the scheme:
1. The Teasing Question: "Did God really say, 'You must not eat from any tree 
in the garden?’ ”
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2. The Robust Assurance: “You will not surely die”
3. The Authority: "For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will 
be opened ..
4. The Guarantee: .. you will be like God, knowing good and evil”
Here is how Nash comments on the scheme:
The biblical example presents two aspects of the rhetorical act. On the one 
hand, we see in it a kind of programme, a set of steps upon which the de­
sign is constructed; and on the other, an aesthetic form or genre, here taking 
shape round the designated markers of the argument; and yet it would be 
perfectly possible for the same construction to be incorporated in a different 
genre. That is to say, we might take the suggested model - Teasing Question, 
Robust Assurance, Authority, Guarantee - and build it into a different sort 
of story; into a dialogue set in a supermarket; into a newspaper editorial on 
commercial ethics; into a sonnet on love or democracy or malt whisky.
(Nash 1989:4)
The same pattern may be applied to the advertisement in question:
1. The Teasing Question: How do you conquer the highest mountain?
2. The Robust Assurance: The same way you accomplish any task. One step at 
a time. The gutsy part is setting the goal in the first 
place.
3. The Authority: Fairchild Aerospace is determined to set the pace in 
the global market for 30 to 95-seat jet airliners and 
large-cabin business jets.
4. The Guarantee: And we’re doing it one aircraft at a time. Starting 
with our revolutionary 328JET and moving forward 
with the all new 428JET, 528JET, 728JET, and 928JET. 
Eventually we’ll have an entire family of aircraft that 
fits the market. All designed for long-haul comfort. 
Maximum economy. And peak performance.
As a consequence, we could say that the overall organisation of the 
advertisement follows a certain pattern, quite commonly used, that is 
motivated by, and results from, the psychology of composition. The com­
position and the first-level rhetorical effects are the results of rhetorical 
procedures that classical rhetoric called heuresis, taxis, and lexis. That 
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is to say, the first-level effects are achieved through a composition of the 
text that is based on a very general knowledge of the addressee, the world, 
and the language.
Lexis, “the dressing of the topic in appropriately expressive and per­
suasive language," is a rhetorical procedure from which the second-level 
rhetorical effects arise. The procedure consists in a variety of choices 
ranging from such trivial decisions as using words with strong positive 
valuations and avoiding ones with negative valuations to more complex 
patterns that classical rhetoric called tropes and figures. A detailed anal­
ysis of such patterns goes beyond the scope of this paper, but I would 
like to stress the fact that the second-level rhetorical effects are based 
on the general linguistic competence on the one hand, and on the gen­
eral "aesthetic sensitivity” on the other. For example, various "repetitive” 
patterns (in the analysed ad one step at a time, echoed later on in one air­
craft at a time) might be just "pleasant" for the addressee, and increase 
the acceptability of the text, which in turn has an impact on the text’s 
persuasiveness.
The lexical choices in persuasive texts do not function persuasively 
only because they appeal to the addressee’s aesthetic sensitivity. The 
phrase one aircraft at a time might have a persuasive potential because 
in combination with the previous phrase {one step at a time) it appeals to 
the reader’s sensitivity. This is, however, only a part of the job this phrase 
has to do. It serves also as one of the cues, allowing the addressee to con­
ceptualise the advertised activity (producing planes) in terms of another 
activity (moving upward to the top of a mountain). The text becomes 
persuasive because of the “perspective” it imposes. The world that the 
advertisement offers is a world under a certain description and the focal 
activity is linguistically encoded in such a way that the addressee per­
ceives the manufacturing process as a journey upward. This perspective 
results from the mental processes that bring about the third-level rhetor­
ical effects.
It is important to notice that while the first-level rhetorical effects 
are a matter of the overall organisation of the text seen as a whole, and 
the second-level effects result from particular combinations or patterns 
of words, phrases, sentences and other units, the third-level rhetorical ef­
fects are markedly different because they are anchored in universal men­
tal processes that the text triggers (the doing something is moving for­
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ward conceptual metaphor), and are only indirectly connected with par­
ticular words or phrases. Classical rhetoric has been almost exclusively 
involved in investigating the first- and the second-level effects. Disre­
garding, for the most part, the underlying cognitive aspects of text pro­
cessing, it has not only put into the background one category of rhetor­
ical effects, but has also given rise to a lot of misconceptions about the 
very nature of the first- and second-level rhetorical effects (cf. for exam­
ple what Turner (1987: 16ff) calls "Aristotle’s metaphor”).
The cognitive approach provides a good perspective that gives jus­
tice to the third-level effects. It allows to judge the rhetorical value of 
persuasive messages on the basis of mental processes that are contin­
gent on the text, its context, the addressee, and the communicative sit­
uation. In saying so, I do not want, however, to undermine the value of 
classical rhetoric as a tool for the analysis of the persuasiveness of texts; 
in turning to the cognitive approach, I do no more than just shift the cen­
tre of gravity. Classical rhetoric thrived in times when the paradigm of 
a persuasive text was an elaborated speech. The speech was prepared 
on the assumption of its conscious evaluation on the part of the listen­
ers; hence the reliance on the first- and second-level rhetorical effects, 
logical argumentation and “ornamentation” with various tropes or fig­
ures. Nowadays, in the times when the paradigm of a persuasive mes­
sage is a salesman’s pitch or a commercial, with their pseudo-logic and 
reliance on slogans, the second- and third-level rhetorical effects come 
into prominence. This is not to say that the overall organisation of the 
text does not play a role any more; example 1 shows clearly that it is 
not the case; even centuries-old persuasive schemes are still operative 
in modern advertisements.
The shift in the emphasis on how the increase in the acceptabil­
ity, and consequently, the persuasiveness of texts is achieved is also re­
flected in such models as the Elaboration Likelihood Model and the 
Heuristic Model. Broadly speaking, they postulate that a great majority 
of persuasive messages (advertising texts in newspapers included) are 
subject to "peripheral processing” that relies on a set of heuristics, and 
that the outcomes of many persuasive practices are the result of sub­
conscious responses to the text rather than conscious "logical” analysis. 
The dichotomy between central and peripheral processing is not equal 
to that between rational and irrational processing. If anything, it is the 
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dichotomy between the conscious and the subconscious; between the 
mental processes that are easily monitored and those that easily "pass 
unnoticed” because they are based on well-entrenched cognitive rou­
tines. The metaphorical rendering of the company’s activities (produc­
ing planes) in terms of another activity (going upward to the top of a 
mountain) in example 1 is possible because there is a fairly universally 
shared mental pattern of conceptualising an activity in terms of mov­
ing forward.
The so-called "cognitivist perspective” covers too broad a research 
area to be summarised in a couple of paragraphs. In what follows, I would 
like to focus only on some basic aspects of the linguistic perspective that 
has come to be called cognitive linguistics. In particular, 1 will focus on 
those aspects that have a bearing on the explanation of how the third- 
level rhetorical effects are created through the linguistic coding.
The basic tenet of cognitive linguists is that linguistic competence 
results from the human being’s constant interaction with, and natural 
development in, the environment in which all of us have to live. This in­
teraction gives rise to, on the one hand, a set of conceptual primitives, 
or kinaesthetic image-schemas (or schemata), and, on the other hand, 
to structured models reflecting reality, which Lakoff calls idealised cog­
nitive models (ICMs).
Kinaesthetic image-schemas are pre-conceptual structured patterns 
that emerge through bodily, physical experience of reality that we all 
share. Johnson says that
in order for us to have meaningful, connected experiences that we can com­
prehend and reason about, there must be pattern and order to our actions, 
perceptions, and conceptions. A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and 
regularity in, or of, these ongoing ordering activities. These patterns emerge 
as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our bodily movements 
through space, our manipulation of objects, and our perceptual interac­
tions. (Johnson 1987: 29)
The schemas exist at a very high level of abstraction and general­
ity, which allows them to function as recurrent patterns for structuring a 
large number of experiences. They are also dynamic - as Johnson says - 
in two distinct respects:
272 Jerzy Świątek
They are a primary means by which we construct or constitute order and are 
not mere passive receptacles into which experience is poured. Unlike tem­
plates, schemata are flexible in that they can take on any number of specific 
instantiations in varying contexts. It is somewhat misleading to say that an 
image schema gets "filled in” by concrete perceptual details; rather, it must 
be relatively malleable, so that it can be modified to fit many similar, but dif­
ferent, situations that manifest a recurring underlying structure.
(Johnson 1987: 30)
To the best of my knowledge there has never been made an attempt 
to systematically classify all image schemas that emerge in human cogni­
tion, but the most commonly mentioned (and most important for organ­
isation and ordering of experience) are the CONTAINER, part-whole, link, 
centre-periphery, scale, and source-path-goal schemas. For the sake 
of illustration, I will focus exclusively on the source-path-goal schema.
The ELM stipulates that in view of inherent limitations (lack of mo­
tivation to get involved on the part of the addressee, no need for cogni­
tion, a very short duration) an advertising slogan will be persuasive if the 
linguistic coding opens up conceptualisations that are universally valid, 
natural and immediately acceptable. Since the advertising slogan basi­
cally refers to what an institution does or offers or what the addressee 
may do if s/he decides to buy a product or use a service, the basic con­
ceptualisation involved is often the doing something is moving forward 
metaphor based on the source-path-goal schema.
Particular conceptualisations may stress various aspects of the un­
derlying metaphor or the schema. They may be a manifestation of the 
general concept a journey:
(2) Let the journey begin (US Navy)
(3) Click, zip, fast round trip (Internal Revenue Service / IRS e-file)
(4) Follow us, we know the way (Bank Handlowy)
(5) Where do you want to go today? (Microsoft)
(6) For the journey ahead (BP)
They may shift the emphasis on the starting point of the journey 
(SOURCE):
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(7) The adventure begins with Pamper
(8) There from the start
(Pampers)
(Adidas)
Or else the destination (goal) may be foregrounded:
(9) Ray-Ban till the end (Ray-Ban)
(10) We’re getting there (British Rail)
(11) Across the street from the ordinary (Best Western International)
(12) If you’ve been waiting for video, it’s arrived (Video 2000, Philips)
The linguistic coding may also make both the starting point and the des­
tination prominent:
(13) From thought to finish (Ernst & Young)
as well as some aspects of the journey (further, ahead on the path, faster):
(14) With us you can go so much further (Stanbic Bank)
(15) IMD has taken us one big step further in the way we do our jobs (IMD)
(16) Step ahead (Nikon)
(17) Ahead of current thinking (National Power)
(18) We go a long way to make you happy (Airtours)
(19) The fast way to a better job (JobSite)
Sometimes the “travellers" become prominent:
(20) The legend rolls on (Harley Davidson)
(21) Where nature meets science (Vitabotics)
(22) Go with the pros instead of the cons (Service 911.com)
or the "driving force” causing the movement along the path:
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(23) Managing perceptions that drive performance (Burson-Marsteller)
(24) We drive the future (Siemens)
(25) Grasp the forces driving the change (Stanford University)
Sometimes the path itself becomes the central element:
(26) Right up your street for value (Woolworth’s)
In the examples presented so far I have just pointed to certain as­
pects of the underlying conceptual structures, although the persuasive 
potential is not infrequently more complex and richer. However, since 
my aim here is just to show how the source-path-goal schema and the 
doing something is moving forward metaphor are used in short persua­
sive messages in advertising, I will only try to point out how this basic 
conceptual pattern may be elaborated, focusing on just one constituent 
element, namely the path.
A simple elaboration may consist in coding more than one PATH sug­
gestive of a number of possible activities that may be undertaken:
(27) Many paths lead to capital growth. We get you there safe and sound
(KfW)
(28) Many paths, one destination (INSEAD)
The kind of conceptualisation presented above is quite easy to 
"detect,” since the lexical signals that tie the real-life events to pre- 
conceptual schemas are fairly conventional. I think nonetheless that 
analogical or similar rhetorical mechanisms underlie quite a lot of per­
suasively effective metaphors, for which the descriptions or explanations 
that traditional rhetoric may give either impoverish the picture or side­
track important, or even the most important, aspects of a persuasive 
message. Here is another example, a metaphorical message in which the 
TIME magazine advertises itself:
(29) Understanding comes with TIME
A trivial explanation of the effectiveness of this metaphor may be 
that it is a kind of pun in which the word denoting the concept of "time” 
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in a fairly popular saying has been replaced with the proper name of a 
magazine. "Trivial” does not mean here “unimportant," for the readers 
will, surely, appreciate the intellectual game in which they are involved. 
This "appreciation” can easily translate into intellectual satisfaction or 
acceptance, a necessary condition for persuasive effects to occur. If one 
chose to stop at that point, one does not exhaust the whole persuasive 
potential of the advertisement. The addressee is typographically cued 
(TIME) to construe the press domain. A piece of commonplace knowl­
edge in this domain is that reading the press in an important source of 
information and understanding of the world. The word understanding, 
on the other hand, elicits the domain of mental processes, in which “un­
derstanding” is viewed as the final outcome (goal) of complex mental 
operations. Finally, it turns out that it is not merely a play on words in 
which the word “time” is crucial, but also a “play on concepts” in which 
the same concept, namely "understanding,” is derived from two distinct 
domains. On the one hand, “understanding” is the goal of mental ac­
tivities (in general); on the other hand, supposedly the same goal is the 
result of reading the magazine. What is more, the internal logic of the ba­
sic schema is reversed, since it is not the "traveller” that moves towards 
the GOAL but the goal moves towards the static addressee. In other words, 
the addressee of the message becomes the goal for the TIME Magazine 
and understanding moving towards him along the path that is delineated 
through consecutive stages of acquiring knowledge.
The persuasive force of the metaphor lies basically in foreground­
ing the two domains. The domain of mental activities evokes complex 
processes that to a large extent are beyond our understanding, and con­
notes mental effort. The press domain foregrounds the act of reading, 
fairly easy and pleasant, in which “understanding” is a natural outcome. 
The reader is "manipulated” in being offered two domains, or two per­
spectives within which the concept of understanding is construed, and 
in being invited to replace one with the other.
It is important to realise that it is reliance on, and evoking of, basic 
conceptual schemas, and then foregrounding or questioning the basic 
logic of conceptual configuration, that creates a novel perspective, that 
offers the addressee “a world under a certain perspective.” A cognitive 
pattern that is normally “transparent” because it is the only way of con­
ceptualising a particular configuration is "made prominent.” In this way 
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the pattern becomes rhetorically effective. Normally, such patterns are 
entirely unconscious. “We have in fact no practical need to analyse them. 
Biologically, they must be unproblematic, making them seem intellectu­
ally boring. But they become intellectually interesting the moment we 
lack them” (Turner 1996: 14). And it is neither the organisation of the 
text nor particular word patterns that are the source of rhetorical effects. 
They are neither first- nor the second-level effects. They are third-level 
rhetorical effects that are brought about via pre-verbal conceptual con­
figurations coded into language in a particular way to produce persua­
sive effects. Only with such a broadly defined metaphorical locus can we 
account for third-level rhetorical effects that reside in the cognitive area, 
and they can be achieved on the assumption of the sender/addressee's 
actively constructing reality, rather than just passively mapping it (in the 
sense in which Grace (1987) uses the term).
The final example is meant to show that the pre-conceptual schemas 
may also contribute to the persuasive potential of a short advertising 
message when the linguistic coding induces various configurations of 
the basic pattern, seemingly violating the internal logic of the schema.
(30) Where do you need to be?
How will you get there?
Does it matter?
Yes, it matters.
The journey is the destination. (Singapore Airlines)
At first glance it may seem that the internal logic of the source-path- 
goal schema is violated. We simply “know” that it cannot be the case that 
goal = motion / path. While the conceptualisation in which an agent 
assumes the role of path does not violate the internal structure and logic 
of the schema, the conceptualisation of goal and PATH fused into one is 
impossible, since it violates basic constraints imposed by the schema. 
Johnson put it in the following way:
To say that image schemata "constrain" our meaning and understanding and 
that metaphorical systems "constrain” our reasoning is to say that they es­
tablish a range of possible patterns of understanding and reasoning. They 
are like channels in which something can move with a certain limited, rela­
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tive freedom. Some movements (inferences) are not possible at all. They are 
ruled out by the image schemata and metaphors. (Johnson 1987: 137)
How, then, does the addressee go about processing the advertise­
ment? I think that the processing involves a number of factors. The com­
bination of the knowledge of the world, the relevance principle and/or 
the Maxim of Quantity makes him reconsider the statement journey is 
the destination once again. There are two possibilities, or, in fact, two 
inferences, a basic one and an extended one, resulting from the same as­
sumptions. If it is not possible that goal is path and the statement jour­
ney is the destination is relevant, there must be some reasons for juxta­
posing the two concepts and treating them as “equal." One of the infer­
ences (contextual effects) that might be arrived at - at the cost of addi­
tional processing effort - is that the “equality" is the “equality” of, say, 
valuations associated with both concepts. The destination, or goal, as 
the raison d’etre of any journey, or the source-path-goal schema, has 
the strongest positive valuations inherent in it (cf. for example Krzeszow- 
ski 1997). Thus, the valuations may be transferred onto the journey or 
PATH / MOVEMENT.
There is another, or complementary, conceptualisation derived from 
the same starting point. PATH cannot be goal if one thinks about a pre- 
conceptual schema "applied” to a particular event. But, faced with the 
incongruity PATH = goal, the addressee conceives of the real-life event 
referred to in the advertisement as an event that is linguistically coded 
through two distinct kinaesthetic schemas. Both are of the same kind, 
but the linguistic form reveals only the path of one event and the goal 
of the other event. In other words, the traveller’s journey is the airlines’ 
goal. Rhetorically speaking, this conceptualisation is a way of making 
“present” quite a unique configuration in which the inherent strong pos­
itive valuations of goal are not just transferred into path; they are val­
uations of the PATH, because the reader is forced to see the path of the 
schema underlying one event (the journey) as the goal of the schema 
underlying the other event (airlines’ activities).
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Conclusions
Persuasion is first of all action aiming at modelling people’s behaviour. 
Language is one of possible forms of action that may be undertaken in 
order to achieve intended results. Theoretical models of persuasion pro­
vide a general analytic framework that is geared towards particular types 
of persuasive attempts and as such may give some cues as to what a lin­
guist should pay attention to in differing contexts. In the case of adver­
tising slogans, for example, the natural constraints inherent in the type 
of communicative events in which slogans are used (no motivation or 
need to elaborate the message, short duration) make it necessary for the 
sender to rely on the "peripheral route” to persuasion. It means, among 
other things, that slogans may be effective if the linguistic coding induces 
basic relevant metaphorical conceptualisations (the source-path-goal 
schema and the doing something is moving forward metaphor) that 
may either make some elements prominent or impose novel configura­
tions of the basic pattern.
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